The policy your clients' due diligence asks for by name. A ready-to-edit Word template that meets ISO 27001 controls A.5.19 to A.5.22, with risk tiers and contract clauses sized for a UK firm of 25 to 250 people.
A supplier security policy sets how an organisation chooses, contracts, monitors and exits the suppliers that handle its information, in proportion to risk. ISO 27001 controls A.5.19 to A.5.22 require defined supplier processes, security requirements agreed with each supplier, ICT supply chain controls and regular supplier review. This Word template suits UK firms of 25 to 250 staff.
The questionnaire from your largest prospect has a section called "Third-party risk". It asks for your supplier security policy, how you rank your suppliers by risk, and whether your contracts let you check their security. The deal is waiting on the answer.
A supplier security policy is how you answer with evidence. This ISO 27001 supplier security policy template gives a UK firm of 25 to 250 staff a ready-to-edit policy in Word, covering controls A.5.19 to A.5.22. It works in both directions: managing your own suppliers, and answering the regulated clients who treat you as theirs.
One Word document, about 14 pages, version 1.0. It has four parts.
Every placeholder is in square brackets. You set the tier thresholds, name the owners, choose your review intervals, and the policy is ready for management approval.
A supplier you've never assessed isn't low risk. It's unknown risk.
A supplier security policy is the document in which leadership sets how the organisation manages the information security risk that comes from its suppliers: which suppliers are in scope, how they're ranked by risk, what's checked before signing, what goes in the contract, how they're monitored and how the relationship ends. It governs the supplier register and the contracts rather than containing them.
Auditors ask for it because ISO 27001 treats your suppliers as part of your own risk. Customers ask for it because, when you hold their data or run part of their service, you're the supplier in their policy.
Most supplier policies only look one way. For a firm that sells to regulated clients, the same policy has to work in both directions.
| Direction | What the policy does | Who checks it |
|---|---|---|
| Your suppliers | Tiers them by risk, sets due diligence and contract clauses, monitors them and manages the exit | Your ISO 27001 auditor, under controls A.5.19 to A.5.22 |
| You as a supplier | Shows clients that the risk you carry for them is managed down your own supply chain: the cloud host, the software tools, the contractors | Your clients' procurement, security and third-party risk teams, through questionnaires, contract schedules and audits |
| Where the two meet | The terms your clients impose on you, such as audit rights, incident notice and subcontracting consent, flow down to the suppliers who help you deliver their service | Both |
| Standard or regulator | What it asks for |
|---|---|
| ISO 27001:2022, control A.5.19 | Define and implement processes and procedures to manage the information security risks of using suppliers' products or services. |
| ISO 27001:2022, control A.5.20 | Establish the relevant information security requirements and agree them with each supplier, based on the type of supplier relationship. |
| ISO 27001:2022, control A.5.21 | Define and implement processes and procedures to manage the information security risks of the ICT products and services supply chain. |
| ISO 27001:2022, control A.5.22 | Regularly monitor, review, evaluate and manage change in suppliers' information security practices and service delivery. |
| UK GDPR, Article 28 | Use only processors that give sufficient guarantees of appropriate technical and organisational measures, under a binding contract covering, among other things, documented instructions, confidentiality, security, authorisation of sub-processors, deletion or return of data at the end, and audits. |
| DORA (EU financial entities) | Manage ICT third-party risk as part of the ICT risk management framework, keep a register of information on all contractual arrangements for ICT services, and include set provisions in those contracts, with more for services that support critical or important functions. |
| FCA (UK authorised firms) | A firm that outsources critical or important operational functions remains fully responsible for its regulatory obligations (SYSC 8.1.6R, or SYSC 8.1.6-AR for common platform firms). For common platform firms, SYSC 8.1.8R sets conditions on the service provider, including effective access to data and premises for the firm, its auditors and the regulator. |
| PRA (banks, building societies, PRA-designated investment firms and insurers) | Supervisory Statement SS2/21, Outsourcing and third party risk management, sets the PRA's expectations for managing outsourcing and other third-party arrangements. |
| Customer due diligence | Security questionnaires commonly ask for the policy, how suppliers are tiered, which suppliers hold client data, and evidence that critical suppliers are reviewed. |
For the depth on each control, see the guides to A.5.19: supplier security across the full lifecycle, A.5.20: supplier agreements that hold up, A.5.21: the ICT supply chain and A.5.22: monitoring and changes to supplier services. Cloud services have a control of their own, covered in the A.5.23 guide.
If your clients are banks, insurers or investment managers, their regulators expect them to manage you, and that reaches you as a contract schedule and a questionnaire. Expect questions on six things.
The template's "being the supplier" appendix lists each of these against the evidence to have ready.
Your client's regulator never signs your contract. Its expectations arrive in it anyway.
With a supplier list to hand, this takes about a day of drafting and one management meeting, then an hour or two for each critical supplier's due diligence. Without the list, start there: a policy can't tier suppliers you haven't found.
Your policy is only as complete as your view of who you rely on. Check you have:
If none of these exist yet, the job is bigger than one policy. That's the point where most firms bring in help.
1. Build the supplier list and name an owner for each (2 to 4 hours)
2. Tier every supplier by risk (1 to 2 hours)
Next, put each supplier into one of three tiers by asking the same five questions: what data it holds, what access it has to your systems, how much of your service depends on it, how hard it would be to replace, and whether it supports something a regulated client has told you is critical. The template gives you the tiering worksheet and suggested thresholds for Critical, High and Low. Most firms of this size end up with a handful of critical suppliers.
3. Set due diligence in proportion to the tier (about an hour, then 1 to 2 hours per critical supplier)
4. Set the contract clauses (about 2 hours, plus legal review)
Then set the minimum security clauses each tier needs in its agreement: confidentiality, the data processing terms UK GDPR Article 28 requires where the supplier processes personal data for you, incident notification within a set time, control of sub-processors and subcontractors, the right to assurance or audit, continuity, and the return or destruction of data at exit. The template gives you a clause checklist marked by tier, so you can hold an existing contract against it and log the gaps. Where terms can't be negotiated, as with the large cloud platforms, record the gaps and how you've covered or accepted them. Where a regulated client has imposed terms on you, check that the suppliers delivering that client's service carry matching ones. Have your legal adviser review the clauses before you rely on them.
5. Monitor, manage change and plan the exit, then approve (one management meeting, then a review cycle)
A contract ends on a date. Access ends only when someone removes it.
| Do it yourself with the template | Do it with GRCMANA | |
|---|---|---|
| What you end up with | An approved supplier security policy, a tiered supplier register and a log of contract gaps | This policy plus a tiered register, due diligence on your critical suppliers, a contract gap review and the evidence your clients' third-party questionnaires ask for, all consistent with each other |
| Your time | About a day plus a management meeting, then 1 to 2 hours per critical supplier, if the groundwork is in place. Considerably more if it isn't | Depends on how much of the groundwork exists. We agree it with you at the start |
| Best if | You have a supplier list, a handful of critical suppliers and someone comfortable reading assurance reports | A client questionnaire or contract schedule is waiting, you don't know which suppliers hold client data, the audit date is fixed, or a deal depends on it |
Prefer the second column? Talk to us about supplier assurance and ISO 27001 readiness.
Most supplier security policies list the right topics. Fewer say who does what, for which supplier, by when. Here is the difference.
| Section | Weak | Strong | Why the strong one passes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | "This policy applies to all third parties." | "This policy applies to every supplier that stores, processes or accesses [Organisation] information, or provides a service supporting [client services], including cloud services, software tools and contractors." | It names what brings a supplier into scope, so the register can be checked against it. |
| Tiering | "Suppliers will be assessed according to risk." | "Suppliers are tiered Critical, High or Low using the worksheet in Appendix A. Any supplier holding client data, or supporting a service a client has designated critical, is at least High." | Written criteria make tiers repeatable, and A.5.19 expects a defined process. |
| Due diligence | "Suppliers must demonstrate appropriate security." | "Before contract, Critical suppliers provide current independent assurance (an ISO 27001 certificate covering the service, or a SOC 2 Type 2 report less than [12] months old), reviewed by [role]." | It says what evidence, how recent, and who reviews it. |
| Agreements | "Contracts will include appropriate security clauses." | "Agreements with Critical and High suppliers include, as a minimum, the clauses in Appendix C, including incident notification within [24] hours and [prior written consent] for subcontracting." | A.5.20 needs requirements agreed with each supplier. A checklist can be tested against a contract. |
| Review and exit | "Suppliers will be reviewed regularly." | "Critical suppliers are reviewed every [12] months and whenever they notify a material change. On exit, [owner] removes access within [5] working days and obtains confirmation that data has been returned or destroyed." | A.5.22 needs regular review. Named timescales give the auditor something to sample. |
Before reading the detail, most auditors check that:
If one fails, expect the auditor to look harder at every supplier.
| Feature | Around 25 staff | Around 250 staff |
|---|---|---|
| Register | A spreadsheet of 30 to 60 suppliers, each with an owner and a tier | A procurement or GRC tool, with tiers and review dates driving reminders |
| Critical suppliers | A handful: cloud hosting, core software and managed IT | Many more, with their own key sub-processors mapped |
| Due diligence | Certificates and SOC 2 reports read by the policy owner | A standard questionnaire, with security reviewing critical and high suppliers before contract |
| Contracts | Your standard terms plus the supplier's data processing agreement, with gaps logged | A clause library and a security schedule, negotiated for critical suppliers |
| Monitoring | An annual review of critical suppliers at a management meeting | Regular reviews of critical suppliers, assurance expiry tracked, and a supplier risk report to management |
| Exit | An offboarding checklist used whenever a supplier ends | Exit plans for critical suppliers, tested where a regulated client depends on them |
The common mistake at 25 staff is a policy written for a bank: on-site audits of every supplier that the firm will never carry out. The common mistake at 250 is a register that stops at procurement, so every tool bought on a card or through a free trial sits outside it.
The policy is only half the evidence. An auditor tests whether it operates, and these are the records they usually ask for:
The most common reasons this policy fails audit:
Each of these is cheaper to fix now than to explain in the audit room, or on a client's due diligence call.
Its scope, roles, risk tiers, due diligence by tier, the minimum security clauses for agreements, flow-down to subcontractors, monitoring, offboarding and exit, and the supplier register. It should also say how exceptions are accepted and how the policy is approved and reviewed.
Ask the same questions of each supplier: what data it holds, what access it has, how much of your service depends on it, how hard it is to replace, and whether a client relies on it. Sort the answers into three tiers, and let the tier set the checks, the clauses and the review interval.
No. Proportion is the point. A low-risk supplier with no access to your data or systems may need only a legitimacy check and confidentiality terms. Save independent assurance and questionnaires for the suppliers whose failure would hurt you or your clients.
The supplier security policy is your internal rulebook for all suppliers. A data processing agreement is a contract with one supplier that processes personal data on your behalf, covering the terms UK GDPR Article 28 requires. The policy says when a data processing agreement is needed and what it must contain.
By tier. Review critical suppliers at least annually and whenever they notify a material change, high-risk suppliers on a longer cycle, and low-risk suppliers at renewal. Track assurance expiry dates too, so a lapsed certificate is caught before an auditor or a client finds it.
Start from a policy that already sets out the tiers, checks and clauses an auditor and a regulated client look for. Download the Word template, build your supplier list, and take it to your next management meeting.
This template is a starting point to adapt to your organisation, not legal advice.